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Abstract
Guided by game theory we develop a model to explain behavioral equi-
libria under uncertainty and interaction with the spot market on balancing
markets. We offer some insights for the general model and derive explicit
solutions for a specific model in which the error distributions and pric-
ing function are given. The most interesting conclusions are the unique
existence of an equilibrium and that no participant acts contrary to the
aggregate market (either all market participants buy or sell power) and
all strategies are, normalized properly, equal (which is rather counter-
intuitive). Furthermore the aggregate behavior is a stochastic process
varying around its own variance.
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11 Introduction
Industrialized countries need steady and reliable electricity supply. Modeling the
electricity market is typically analyzed with either Supply-Function-Equilibria
(for examples refer to Klemperer and Meyer (1989), Green and Newbery (1992),
Green (1996), Weber and Overbye (1999) or Berry et al. (1999a)), with Cournot-
models (e.g. Cardell et al. (1997), Hogan (1997), Hobbs et al. (2000), Boisseleau
et al. (2004)) or Stackelberg-models (e.g. Wolf and Smeers (1997) or Chen et al.
(2004)). The former is a better fit to the technical realization of many electricity
markets where bids are given as supply or cost functions.
The electricity market is a forward market with a single not-storeable good (see
Allaz (1992), Allaz and Vila (1993) or Green and Newbery (1992)). The game-
theoretic literature usually deals with a two-stage approach with power generators
choosing their investment (or, in fact, their capacity) in the first stage and the
price in the second (von der Fehr and Harbord (1997), Coq (2002) and Sanin
(2005)). Introductions to energy market models can be found in Meibom et al.
(2003), Boisseleau et al. (2004), Yao et al. (2004) and Sanin (2005).
We use a simultaneous one-stage approach which is fundamentally different from
the usual models and is solely based on the uncertainty of the demand for power
and the price on the spot market. This Cournot-Model consists of two phases:
1. In the first phase all participants (henceforth called players) buy and sell
energy on the spot market (or wholesale market) at a given price. To
simplify analysis we assume that the price is public knowledge.
2. The players cannot act in the second phase. The actual aggregate balance
of power is determined as well as the power balance for every player. A
transmission system operator (TSO) ensures that demand and supply are
in balance. Depending on the aggregate power balance the TSO prices
power with a high price if the aggregate market is short on power or a low
price otherwise.
Every player who is short on power is charged with the fixed price (by the
TSO) and all players who bought too much power are compensated. This
is the balancing power market (or regulating power market).
Three questions immediately arise.
• How much power should each player buy on the spot market?
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• How can the TSO regulate the players (which price should be set to suppress
strategic power trading)?
• Is there an (unique) equilibrium solution at all?
Regarding the last question Sanin (2005) find such an equilibrium but she used
a quite different set of assumptions. In our model this is also true for a realistic
case but must not hold in more general cases since the functions of the expected
utilities are not convex.
It is not trivial at all that an equilibrium should exist anyway since every player
has an incentive to behave contrary to the aggregate market. The price of power
will be low if the aggregate market buys too much, and it is therefore better to
buy less than the expected demand since the charged price will be low. Similarly
there is an incentive to buy too much power if the aggregate market will be low on
power, since the compensating price will be high. This suggests that there should
be either no nash equilibrium besides buying the expected amount of power or
the decision to buy more/less than the expected demand should depend on the
variance of the actual demand1. It turns out that neither must be the case.
In the case that the expected price on the balancing market equals the spot
price, intuition suggests that the power bought by all players should be equal
to the expected demand. It turns out that this depends (at least) on the price
function of the TSO. Moreover, under reasonable assumptions, the real price on
the balancing power market does not matter - only the difference between the
minimum and maximum price is relevant.
1.1 Distinction from related literature
We explicitly neglect several characteristics which are commonly part of the
widely used models. We do not consider the (double)-auction mechanisms (
e.g. Wolfram (1998), Supatgiat et al. (2001), Wolak (2000), Baldick et al. (2004)
or Boisseleau et al. (2004)) to calculate prices on either the spot- or the balanc-
ing market. We are also not concerned with the technical distribution of power
(e.g. Berry et al. (1999b), Kleindorfer et al. (2000) or Willems (2006)) or the
behavior of the power generators and therefore neglect any constraints given by
1The reasoning could be that players with high variance have an incentive to buy larger
amounts of strategic power to insure them against unexpected high prices; this could be ex-
ploited, ceteris paribus, by players with low variance.
3the generators (as in Berry et al. (1999b), Supatgiat et al. (2001), Yao et al.
(2004), Sweeting (2004) or Holmberg (2004)). These are no serious limitations
since the price on the balancing market can vary in every round, as long as every-
thing is public knowledge. Additionally we assume that buying strategic power
(which means buying intentionally more or less than the expected demand) is not
punished. In Germany this is forbidden by law (see for example RWE (2006))
but there has been no actual prosecution in Germany2 although such behavior is
obvious (Rupp, 2003).
The model we present provides a new, straight forward and easy way to verify
whether an energy market has reached its equilibrium state and to understand
why the aggregate power on the balancing market does not necessarily vary
around zero. Additionally we offer a convenient way to see how the prices on
the balancing market influence the market behavior. We start with a general set-
ting with risk-neutral players and than proceed to normal distributed forecasting
errors and a specific pricing function3 for the balancing market.
The paper is organized in the following way: section 2 discusses the model, section
3 includes some results of the most general case when (almost) no assumptions
are made about the model parameters, while section 4 and 5 derive the important
results for models with normal errors and two specific pricing functions. Section
6 concludes the paper with a short discussion. The bulk of the appendix contains
the long proofs of some propositions in section 4 and 5.
2 The Model
Basically the model consists of the stochastic error of each player (difference of
predicted and actual power demand of all respective end customers), the strate-
gically bought power on the spot market by each player and the pricing function
of the TSO.
• X := (X1, . . . , Xn) is a Rn−valued random variable, whereasXi is the power
demand (of all end customers) of player i
2Private correspondence with a manager of a large energy company.
3The binary function fits the German balancing market reasonably well. For more informa-
tion about the German energy market refer to Swider and Weber (2000), Rupp (2003), Meibom
et al. (2003) or RWE (2006) for a specific example.
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– σ2i := Var(Xi), 0 ≤ σ2i <∞
– µ := (µ1, . . . , µn) ∈ Rn and µi := E[Xi]
– X1, X2, . . . , Xn are mutually independent and have a density
• v := (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ Rn, whereas vi is the amount of power strategically
bought by player i
• ps is the price paid on the spot market
• M = M(X, µ, v) :=
n∑
i=1
(Xi − (µi + vi)) is the aggregate unsatisfied demand
for power
• pb = f(M) is the price on the balancing market fixed by the TSO, deter-
mined with the pricing function f(M) which fulfills the following conditions:
– ∃M ≥ 0 : M ≥M ⇔ f(M) ≥ ps
– f is monotonically increasing, non-negative and bounded
– f is continuous in sections
• Gi(vi) = Gi(X, µ, v) := (µi + vi −Xi)f(M) − vipb is the monetary gain of
player i
All players are fully informed (they know all parameters and functions), all act
independently and simultaneously in every round and all players maximize their
expected profit. Thus we have to deal with a typical open ended game theoretic
problem under full information.
Given all information we have to find all vectors v∗ which satisfy
E[Gi(v∗)] ≥ E[Gi(vi|vj = v∗j ∀j 6= i)] i = 1 . . . n. (1)
Without loss of generality we can set µ = 0 since we can otherwise define X′ :=
X − µ and v′ := v − µ. Then (v − X) is distributed as (v′ − X′) - the expected
demand would simply be adjusted by the strategic amount of power.
Since the global condition given by equation (1) is hard to analyze we restrict
ourselves to the commonly used local equilibrium conditions: the first derivative
of E[Gi(v)] must be zero for all i:
∂
∂vi
E[Gi(v)] = 0
⇔ E
[
(vi −Xi) ∂∂vif(M)
]
+ E[f(M)]− ps = 0
⇔ E [(vi −Xi) ∂∂M f(M)] = E[f(M)]− ps.
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We can rewrite these equations as
E [(vi −Xi)f ′(M)] = E[f(M)]− ps, (2)
E [(vi −Xi)f ′(M)] = E [(vj −Xj)f ′(M)] ∀i, j. (3)
These local conditions imply an equilibrium only for marginal deviations. In the
case of non-convex Gi’s there might be multiple local equilibria which might be
global maxima only for different subsets of players. Henceforth we always refer
to local equilibria, unless stated otherwise.
2.1 Intuition
There are several basic concepts which seem to be easily applicable to the model
but eventually are not - at least not in the more specific models which are acces-
sible to further analysis.
2.1.1 Existence of equilibria
As already mentioned in the introduction, intuition suggests that there should be
either no equilibrium at all (except v = 0) or the signs of the vi should depend
on σ2i .
A player should, since he knows the expected amount of power of the aggregate
market when all other players strategies are fixed, do the opposite as the aggregate
market does: buy more power if the aggregate market is expected to be low on
power and buy less otherwise. Only in the case that the aggregate market balance
is expected to be zero and the expected price equals the price on the spot market,
v = 0, should be a nash equilibrium. While the latter property holds in the
specific models, the former does not.
It would also be intuitive if the sign of each individual would at least depend on
the variances of the Xi. Players with large variances should be more concerned
to drive the market in one direction to avoid, for example, being charged with
high prices on the balancing power market (when the spot price is comparably
low). This should be exploitable by players with low variances.
It turns out in the specific models that the strategies of all players share the same
sign and, when normalized, are essentially all equal.
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2.1.2 Necessary Condition
The necessary conditions expressed in equation (2) imply that every player buys
such an amount of energy that the marginal benefit of selling power on the bal-
ancing market (RHS) equals the expected reduction of the price (LHS) generated
by the marginal increase of power. At first glance it is tempting to assume that
ps = E[pb] is a necessary condition for equation (1) to hold4 - if the price on the
spot market equals the expected price on the balancing market there should be
no incentive for any player to change his strategy given the strategy of all others.
In the case of ps < E[pb] power on the spot market could be bought at a lower
price than the expected price on the balancing power market. Therefore there
should be at least one player with an incentive to increase his strategic amount of
power since he could sell this marginal increase at an expectedly higher price. In
the case of ps > E[pb] there should be at least one player decreasing his strategic
amount of power (e.g. selling power on the spot market) in order to regain it at
an expectedly lower price on the balancing power market.
It turns out that this intuition must not hold in all cases.
3 The general model
In the most general form of the model we derive only a few results.
Proposition 3.1 When v∗ fulfills equation (1) and Xn+1 = 0 a.s., then
E[f(M)] = ps ⇔ (v∗1, . . . , v∗n, 0) also fulfills equation (1) for n+ 1.
Proof
Remember: M =
n∑
i=1
(Xi − vi).
⇒:
E[f(M)] = ps. Since E[f(M − vn+1)] is monotone in vn+1, for all w ∈ R, w 6= 0
holds
Gn+1((v
∗
1, . . . , v
∗
n, w)) = w(E[f(M − w)]− ps) < 0 = Gn+1((v∗1, . . . , v∗n, 0)).
4This is a condition concerning the aggregate market and tells us nothing about the indi-
vidual strategies.
7⇐:
Assume E[f(M)] 6= ps. Since E[f(M − vn+1)] is affine linear in vn+1, there exists
a w ∈ R, w 6= 0 which fulfills
Gn+1((v
∗
1, . . . , v
∗
n, w)) = w(E[f(M − w)]− ps) > 0 = Gn+1((v∗1, . . . , v∗n, 0)).
Therefore (v∗1, . . . , v
∗
n, w) does not fulfill equation (1) for any w 6= 0, whereas
w = 0 removes player n+ 1 from the market system.

Definition 3.2 (Closed market) We call a market closed when there is no
incentive for other players (who are not forced to participate in the market, e.g.
players with zero variance) to join the market5.
It sounds reasonable that the market should always be closed since otherwise (up
to to an infinite number of) players could join the system. The market is closed
anyway when either v∗ = 0 or Gi(v∗) ≤ 0,∀i > n.
Corollary 3.3 When the expected price on the balancing power market equals
the spot price the former market is closed: E[f(M)] = ps ⇒ the balancing power
market is closed.
4 The specific model
To derive specific results analytically we introduce some further assumptions.
We begin with a more general class of pricing function f to subsequently derive
afterwards specific results with a binary f . We assume furthermore that all Xi
are normally distributed.
5Unlike in other markets the TSO must always, at least in theory, satisfy every demand on
the balancing market.
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4.1 f as the error-function
Let f be given by
f(M) = f(M,a, ph, pl) :=
(ph − pl)
2
(erf(aM) + 1) + pl. (4)
The error-function erf(x) is by definition 2√
pi
x∫
0
e−t
2
dt. The parameter a controls
the slope around M = 0. More details are given in the appendix A.1.
To simplify notation we define
V :=
n∑
k=1
vk and S
2 :=
n∑
k=1
σ2k as well as Vi := V − vi and S2i := S2 − σ2i .
Thus we can write E[M ] = −V and Var(M) = S2, hence
M ∼ N (−V, S2).
4.2 Equilibria
Necessary conditions for the nash equilibrium (equation (1)) to hold for a v∗
are that the first derivatives of the Gi are zero and the second derivatives are
negative. It is then sufficient to show that the local maximum attained is the
global maximum for each player and the relationship between all v∗i is unique.
In the specific model we derive the necessary conditions which are sufficient for
local equilibria.
Theorem 4.1 Let all Xi be normally distributed and f as given in equation (4).
The (not necessarily unique) local nash equilibrium, given by equations (2) and
(3), is determined by the following conditions
v∗j =
2na2σ2j + 1
2na2σ21 + 1
v∗1 , j = 2, . . . , n,
E[f(M∗)]− ps = E [(v∗1 −X1)f ′(M∗)]
There are either one or two local equilibria.
The proof is given in appendix A.1. The theorem establishes the conditions for
local equilibriums. In such a situation no player will deviate from his current
strategy by any small amount. However, we emphasize that the possibility that
a player may achieve a higher benefit, if he deviates by a large amount, is not
ruled out in general.
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Corollary 4.1 Some interesting properties immediately follow from the theorem
for local equilibria:
• All v∗i have the same sign.
• v∗j
2na2σ2j+1
=
v∗i
2na2σ2i+1
. Properly normalized, all v∗i are equal.
• Either all v∗i are zero or none.
Whether the market system is closed is not obvious. The derived properties are
not sufficient to answer this question. However it would not be unreasonable to
suppose that the expected benefits are negative in the local equilibriums which
would be sufficient for a closed market.
Corollary 4.2 For constant a we have
v∗ =
−→
0 ⇔ E[f(M)] = ps = ph + pl
2
.
This is also true for n→∞.
Proof
With the optimal v∗ the left side of equation (2) is without loss of generality
(ph − pl)v1a(4n2a2σ21 + 1)√
2a2S2 + 1
√
pi(2na2σ21 + 1)
e
−a2n2(2a2S2+1)
2na2σ21+1
v21
.
Therefore the left side is zero iff v∗ = 0 for every fixed n as well as for n→∞.
Thus v∗ = 0 implies E[f(M)] = ps while E[f(M)] evaluates to ph+pl2 .
E[f(M)] is a strictly monotonic continuous function and therefore a unique v1
exists such that E[f(M)] = ps. Since on the one hand V ∗ = 0⇒ E[f(M)] = ph+pl2
and, additionally, all v∗i share the same sign, all v
∗
i must be zero.

Example
Let us assume that we have 10 identical players with σ2 = 1, a = 1, ph = 1, pl = 0
and ps = 0.75. Obviously, v
∗
i = v
∗
j ∀i, j. Since the price on the spotmarket is
high compared to the neutral expected price pb = 0.5, we expect any equilibrium
vi to be negative. The second condition of theorem 4.1 is satisfied for vi ≈
−0.21751. Since the analytical form is not easily accessible for evaluation (neither
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exact nor numerical), we performed some simulations which indicate that this v∗
is the global maximum for all players and the expected benefits are negative.
Thus this seems to be a true nash equilibrium as defined by equation (1) and is
minimizing the losses of all players. Since there is no expected benefit for any
additional player (the new equilibrium for n = 11, σ11 = 0 also yields negative
benefits) the market is closed.

5 The binary model
A specific sub-model of the model presented in section 4, which can be analyzed
in more detail, is attained by taking the limits a → ∞, which transforms the
pricing function into an indicator function
f(M) =
ph if M ≥ 0pl otherwise. (5)
All previous results can now be easily reevaluated - analyzing G in the binary
model beforehand had been impractical. A binary pricing function is not a bad
approximation, as can be seen in RWE (2006) or Rupp (2003), in the the case of
the RWE-balancing market in Germany.
Theorem 5.1 Let all Xi be normally distributed, f be given as in equation (5)
and Φ−1 be the inverse of the normal distribution function. The unique global
nash equilibrium, given by equation (1), is determined by
v∗i =
σ2i
S
Φ−1
(
ph − ps
ph − pl
)
. (6)
The proof is given in appendix A.3.
Corollary 5.1 (The market process) Let λ := Φ−1([ph − pz]/[ph − pn]) and
X =
∑n
i=1Xi then summation over all players leads to the following process
characterization:
M = −λ√Var(X) +X.
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Thus the demand of power on the balancing market is a stochastic process driven
by two different components: the variance of the actual demand of all players, the
distance from the spotmarket price to the upper price cap and the price bandwith
on the balancing market.
When the prices do not vary (i.e. λ is a constant) the process M solely varies
around its own variance (with the mean −λ√Var(X) and the noise term X).
Thus, given a negative λ, the process is driven upwards (downwards) if the vari-
ance of X increases (decreases). Naturally the variance of M is the same as the
variance of X. This is a curious result because such processes are not commonly
found in practice.
In contrast to the previous setting, the following corollary is proven to hold:
Corollary 5.2 E[f(M)] = ps and therefore the market system is closed.
The proof is part of the proof of theorem 5.1. The corollary from the previous
section can be transferred one-to-one.
Corollary 5.3
• All v∗i have the same sign.
• v∗j
σ2j
=
v∗i
σ2i
. Properly normalized all v∗i are equal.
• Either all v∗i are zero or none.
The binary pricing function also implies
Corollary 5.4 Only the span between the high and low price cap is relevant - the
absolute prices do not matter. Without loss of generality the TSO can set pl = 0
and influence the market by varying the high price ph.
6 Conclusion
Motivated by the balancing power market system we have developed a one-stage
game-theoretic model to describe optimal behavior of rational players on balanc-
ing markets. In such a system players buy power on a spot market and then the
unsatisfied power demand is traded automatically on the balancing power market
at a given price (depending on the aggregate demand of power of all customers).
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We explicitly incorporated the uncertainty of the players in regard to the power
demand of their customers and the price on the spot market as the driving forces
to determine the optimal strategy of each individual player. Besides some general
results, we derive an explicit characterization for the unique global nash equilib-
rium and the properties of the aggregate market in the case of a binary pricing
function.
We emphasize three important properties of the binary case: in equilibrium all
players follow the same strategy (discerned only by the variances of their forecast
error), the expected price on the balancing market will be the same as on the
spot market (a different approach by Sanin (2005) also leads to identical prices on
both markets) and the behavior of the aggregate market is a stochastic process
varying about its own variance.
The existence of such an equilibrium is not trivial. On the one hand it may
depend, in theory, on the specific model (a similar continuous pricing function
leads to two local equilibria - but it is not ruled out that the solution is a global
equilibrium). Furthermore, it is not obvious that an equilibrium should exist
anyway - at first glance, switching the strategy given the fixed strategy of all
other players should result in a higher benefit.
We think that the benefit of every player in the specific models will always be
negative in the equilibrium but have not proven this claim because the equations
are too complicated to be solved. The behavior of the players could then be
interpreted as an insurance against the uncertainty of their forecast errors. The
higher the variance and the larger the difference between the price of the spot
market and the mean price on the balancing power market, the more the player
must buy to be on the safe side that the worst case (buying very expensive
balancing power when the price on the spot market was low or selling power at a
very low price when the price was high) is avoided in favor of the less expensive
situation (selling power on the balancing market at a very low price when the
price on the spot market was low or buying power at a very high price when the
price was high).
There are still some questions left unanswered. We think, but have in no way
proven, that the benefit of the equilibria in the specific models is always negative.
We only considered pure strategies. Mixed strategies will always lead to nash
equilibria (which may not be different than the equilibria we found) but will
probably be difficult to analyze analytically. Moreover, in the case of binary
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pricing functions the results may hold regardless of the kind of distribution of the
error terms (as long as they have continuous densities). Although we have reasons
to doubt, other pricing functions may lead to different results. It would also
be interesting to incorporate stepwise pricing functions or a covariance structure
(removing the independence assumption) or to answer the question whether there
is any model specification which allows differently signed6 optimal strategies.
In an upcoming paper we apply this model to the German balancing power market
of the RWE zone and show that the data can be applied to the binary model
and the behavior of the aggregate market can be replicated as soon as the prices
of the spotmarket (taken from the EEX, the European Power Exchange stock
market, EEX (2006)) become similar to the mean prices of the balancing power
market (which has in fact been the case for the last two years 2004 and 2005).
A Appendix
A.1 The price function f(M)
The following graphs show f with ph = 9, pl = 1 and a = 0.5, 1 and 2:
This function fulfills all conditions given in section 2 and is infinitely often dif-
ferentiable
The first and second derivatives are
∂
∂M
f(M) =
a(ph − pl)√
pi
e−(aM)
2
and
∂2
∂M2
f(M) =
−2a3(ph − pl)M√
pi
e−(aM)
2
.
This function does not fit very well for realistic prices where M is near zero.
Prices near the mean value of the high and low price caps are only rarely seen in
Germany. Nevertheless, this function is still important since its main purpose is
to analytically tackle the binary case.
6Equilibria in which some market participants buy and some sell strategic power.
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A.2 Proof of Theorem 4.1
Proof Equation (2) is the second condition in the theorem. The first condition
refers to equation (3) and can be written explicitly and simplified:
∀i, j : 1
σi
√
2pi
∞∫
−∞
(vi − x)e
− x2
2σ2
i
∞∫
−∞
a(ph − pl)√
pi
e−(a(x+y−V ))
2 e
− y2
2S2
i
Si
√
2pi
dydx
=
1
σj
√
2pi
∞∫
−∞
(vj − x)e
− x2
2σ2
j
∞∫
−∞
a(ph − pl)√
pi
e−(a(x+y−V ))
2 e
− y2
2S2
j
Sj
√
2pi
dydx
⇔ (ph − pl)(vi + 2a
2viS
2
i + 2a
2viσ
2
i − 2a2σ2i V )ae
− V 2a2
1+2a2S2
i
+2a2σ2
i
(1 + 2a2S2i + 2a
2σ2i )
3
2
√
pi
=
(ph − pl)(vj + 2a2vjS2j + 2a2vjσ2j − 2a2σ2jV )ae
− V 2a2
1+2a2S2
j
+2a2σ2
j
(1 + 2a2S2j + 2a
2σ2j )
3
2
√
pi
.
Since by definition 2a2S2k + 2a
2σ2k = 2a
2S2 for all k, we can rewrite these rela-
tionships to
∀i, j : vi + 2a2viS2 − 2a2σ2i (Vj + vj) = vj + 2a2vjS2 − 2a2σ2j (Vj + vj)
⇔ ∀i, j : vi + 2a
2viS
2 − 2a2Vj(σ2i − σ2j )
1 + 2a2S2 + 2a2(σ2i − σ2j )
= vj. (7)
In the next steps we show that the v∗i given in the theorem is a solution for
these relationships. Since the equations (3) form a linear equation-system with
n unknown parameters and n− 1 independent equations the derived relationship
is unique7 (in other words: every solution has one degree of freedom). We then
proceed to show that the second derivative has two roots. Since E[Gi] tends
to −∞ as vi tends to ±∞ and is continuous there exist two local maxima and
one local minima8. Therefore, the last free v1 is determined by the largest local
maxima.
We have to show that
vi + 2a
2viS
2 − 2a2Vj(σ2i − σ2j )
1 + 2a2S2 + 2a2(σ2i − σ2j )
=
2na2σ2j + 1
2na2σ2i + 1
vi
7Players with identical variances just reduce the number of equations.
8As is shown later, these three local extremals collapse to one when the parameter a or n
tends to infinity.
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holds:
vi + 2a
2viS
2 − 2a2Vj(σ2i − σ2j )
1 + 2a2S2 + 2a2(σ2i − σ2j )
=
vi + 2a
2viS
2
1 + 2a2S2 + 2a2(σ2i − σ2j )
−
2a2vi
2na2σ2i+1
 n∑
k=1
k 6=j
2na2σ2k + 1
 (σ2i − σ2j )
1 + 2a2S2 + 2a2(σ2i − σ2j )
=
(vi + 2a
2viS
2)(2na2σ2i + 1)− 2a2vi(σ2i − σ2j )(2na2S2j + n− 1)
(1 + 2a2S2 + 2a2[σ2i − σ2j ])(2na2σ2i + 1)
=
vi
2na2σ2i + 1
(
(1 + 2a2S2)(2na2σ2i + 1)− 2a2(σ2i − σ2j )(2na2S2j + n− 1)
1 + 2a2S2 + 2a2(σ2i − σ2j )
)
=
vi
2na2σ2i + 1
(
(1 + 2a2S2)(1 + 2na2σ2j ) + (4na
4σ2j + 2a
2)(σ2i − σ2j )
1 + 2a2S2 + 2a2(σ2i − σ2j )
)
=
vi
2na2σ2i + 1
(
(1 + 2a2S2)(1 + 2na2σ2j ) + (1 + 2na
2σ2j )2a
2(σ2i − σ2j )
1 + 2a2S2 + 2a2(σ2i − σ2j )
)
=
2na2σ2j + 1
2na2σ2i + 1
vi
The second derivative is
∂2
∂v2i
E[Gi(v)]
=
∂
∂vi
(
E
[
(vi −Xi) ∂
∂vi
f(M)
]
+ E[f(M)]
)
=
∂
∂vi
(
−E
[
(vi −Xi) ∂
∂M
f(M)
])
− ∂
∂M
E[f(M)]
= E
[
(vi −Xi) ∂
2
M2
f(M)
]
− 2E
[
∂
∂M
f(M)
]
=
∞∫
−∞
(vi − x)√
2piσ2i
e
−x2
2σ2
i
∞∫
−∞
1√
2piS2i
e
−y2
2S2
i
−2a3(ph − pl)(y + x− V )√
pi
e−a
2(y+x−V )2dydx
−2
∞∫
−∞
1√
2piS2
e
−x2
2S2
a(ph − pl)√
pi
e−a
2(x−V )2dx
= −2(ph − pl)a −e
− a2V 2
1+2a2S2
(1 + 2a2S2)5/2
√
pi
[
a4(4S4 − 2S2V vi − 2S2σ2i + 2V 2σ2i )
+a2(4S2 − V vi − σ2i ) + 1
]
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Without loss of generality we set i = 1 and use vj =
2na2σ2j+1
2na2σ21+1
v1 and V =
2na2S2+n
2na2σ21+1
v1. The second derivative then has the following two roots:
± 2na
2σ21 + 1
a
√
2na2S2 + n
√
2a2S2 − a2σ21 + 1.
Therefore for every a and n there are two v∗ which satisfy the local equilibrium
conditions - the final vector is then given by the larger E[G1(v∗)].

A.3 Proof of theorem 5.1
Proof
1. Theorem 4.1 and equation (3) lead to
v∗j = lim
a→∞
2na2σ2j + 1
2na2σ2i + 1
v∗i =
σ2j
σ2i
v∗i and therefore V
∗
i =
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
v∗j =
v∗i
σ2i
S2i .
2. Now condition (2) can be expressed as
lim
a→∞
E[(v∗i −X)f ′(M)] = E[f(M)]− ps
⇔ lim
a→∞
(ph − pl)(v∗i + 2a2v∗i S2i − 2a2σ2i V ∗i )ae−
V ∗2a2
1+2a2S2
(1 + 2a2S2)
3
2
√
pi
= E[f(M)]− ps
⇒ (ph − pl)(v
∗
i S
2
i − σ2i V ∗i )e−
V ∗2
2S2√
2piS3
= E[f(M)]− ps
⇔
(ph − pl)(v∗i S2i − σ2i v
∗
i
σ2i
S2i )e
−V ∗2
2S2
√
2piS3
= E[f(M)]− ps
⇔ 0 = E[f(M)]− ps
Therefore we have E[f(M)] = ps in any equilibrium.
3. V ∗ = v∗i
S2
σ2i
. The vector v∗ is unique, since the only free variable v∗i has a a
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single solution in equation (2):
E[f(M)] = ps
⇔ P (M ≥ 0)ph + [1− P (M ≥ 0)]pl = ps
⇔ P (M ≥ 0)(ph − pl) = (ps − pl)
⇔ P (X ≥ V ∗) = ps − pl
ph − pl
⇔ P (X < V ∗) = ph − ps
ph − pl
⇔ P
(
X < v∗i
S2
σ2i
)
=
ph − ps
ph − pl
⇔ v∗i
S
σ2i
= Φ−1
(
ph − ps
ph − pl
)
⇔ v∗i =
σ2i
S
Φ−1
(
ph − ps
ph − pl
)
Therefore we have a single unique extremal which has to be a global maximum.
Plugging V into the second derivative from the appendix A.2 and taking the
limit9 a→∞ the second derivative now becomes
−(ph − pl)(2S
2 − σ21)√
2piS3
e
−S
2v21
2σ41 < 0.

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